Suites données aux recommandations du comité et du Conseil d’administration - Rapport No. 326, Novembre 2001

Effect given to the recommendations of the Committee and the Governing Body

1. 102. When it last examined this case at its meeting of March 2001 [see 324th Report, paras. 623-675], the Committee requested the Government to take the necessary measures so that an organization whose representativeness in a given sector, in line with ILO principles, had been objectively demonstrated and whose independence was established, was able to sign, and where necessary to be the sole signatory to, collective agreements, in order to make Luxembourg practice fully compatible with freedom of association.
2. 103. In a communication of 27 July 2001, the Government stated that it did not intend to oppose the Committee’s recommendation. However, it wished to place certain observations relating to the case before the Committee. The Government explained that the Luxembourg system of social dialogue was based on institutionalized tripartism comprising strong organizations on the side of the social partners, which were present throughout the country and in most branches of economic activity. This presence accounted for their representativeness but also explained their responsibility for drawing up answers to questions of national interest. For example, when the national action plan for employment was drawn up, with a view to implementing the European employment strategy, the national Tripartite Coordination Committee, consisting of the major representative trade unions, adopted wage restraint as one of the points of the plan. In this regard, the Government was of the opinion that only trade unions that were able to go beyond the partisan interests of a group of employees, and able to act on behalf of what was ultimately the common interest of all salaried employees, would have the necessary responsibility and influence to contribute to the implementation of a national policy of this sort.
3. 104. Moreover, the Government considers that the Committee’s recommendation may carry the seeds of corporatism in it, by giving power – in some cases excessive – to trade unions which exclusively defend the interests of a fairly small specific group of salaried employees. In addition, even though the short-term interest of salaried employees represented by a purely sectoral trade union may appear relevant, such a selfish corporatist attitude could count against them in the long term. Hence, for the management of a crisis in one sector to form a relevant part of a policy of solidarity taking into account the interests of salaried employees directly concerned and of the national community, it would be necessary to have independent and powerful unions. In this regard, the Government fears that the Committee’s recommendation may pave the way both for an unhealthy fragmentation of the union scene and for the risk of “house” trade unions developing within enterprises. This would give such “single-enterprise” sectors an unexpected opportunity for signing collective agreements with a union whose development had been promoted by the employer and which would be easier to manipulate than powerful national unions.
4. 105. Finally, the Government considers that a viable solution might be as follows: if a trade union has a strong presence in a sector, a collective agreement could not be signed without it, but the co-signature of a nationally representative union would be necessary. In this way, the principle defended by the ILO would be respected, without jeopardizing the Luxembourg social model. In addition, the Government said that it had initiated a reform of the legislation on collective agreements and that it wanted, among other things, to incorporate the ILO’s position in its considerations. A preliminary draft law was due to be finalized shortly and the social partners would be consulted in connection with it.
5. 106. The Committee noted with interest the detailed information supplied by the Government. While taking account of the specific nature of the Luxembourg social model, the Committee reiterated its earlier conclusions, namely that imposing national and multi-sectoral representation in interpretation of the 1965 Act is contrary to the principles of freedom of association since it could prevent the most representative union in a given sector from being the sole signatory to collective agreements and thus from defending fully the interests of the workers whom it represents. However, the Committee stresses the fact that the representativeness of a trade union organization in a given sector must be objectively demonstrated in line with ILO principles. Moreover, as regards the independence of a trade union organization and the danger of the development of trade unions that are promoted and manipulated by the employer, the Committee again stresses the fact that it is only when their independence vis-à-vis the employer and the authorities is established that trade union organizations may have access to collective bargaining. The Committee again reiterates that the criteria of representativeness and independence attributed to trade union organizations must be determined by a body offering every guarantee of independence and objectivity. Finally, noting the legislative reform undertaken by the Government on this issue, the Committee reminds the latter that it can have recourse to technical assistance from the ILO with respect to the implementation of its recommendation.