Solicitud directa (CEACR) - Adopción: 2012, Publicación: 102ª reunión CIT (2013)

Convenio sobre la inspección del trabajo, 1947 (núm. 81) - Guyana (Ratificación : 1966)

Otros comentarios sobre C081

Observación

Solicitud directa

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Referring to its observation, the Committee wishes to raise the following additional points.

Articles 3(1)(a) and (b), 13, 17 and 18 of the Convention. Enforcement and advisory functions of the labour inspection and legal proceedings against offending employers. In reply to the Committee’s previous comments, the Government indicates that presently, there are no court decisions in proceedings instituted against employers for infringements relating to the holding of registers, dismissal notices and the payment of redundancy pay, paid leave, overtime and salaries, but employers are invited to attend seminars with a view to correcting the various breaches.

The Committee draws attention to paragraphs 279 and 280 of its 2006 General Survey on Labour Inspection according to which while technical advice and information supplied by the labour inspectors can only encourage compliance with legal provisions, it should nonetheless be accompanied by an enforcement mechanism enabling those guilty of violations reported by labour inspectors to be prosecuted. The credibility of any inspectorate depends to a large extent on its ability to advise employers and workers on the most effective means of complying with the legal provisions within its remit; however, it also depends on the existence and implementation of a sufficiently dissuasive enforcement mechanism. For the labour inspectorate, the functions of enforcement and advice are inseparable in practice. The Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information on the enforcement activities of the labour inspectors including notifications of violations, warnings, the initiation or recommendation of prosecutions and the imposition of penalties and to provide copies of relevant court decisions. Moreover, drawing attention to its General Observation of 2009 on the importance of cooperation between the labour inspectorate and the justice system, the Committee requests the Government to indicate any measure taken to encourage due diligence and attention in the treatment by judicial bodies of violations reported by labour inspectorates as well as disputes in the same fields referred directly to them by workers and their organizations.

Furthermore, the Committee requests the Government to provide details on the advisory activities carried out by the labour inspectorate and in particular, the seminars addressed to employers found in violation of legal provisions enforceable by labour inspectors (e.g. content, duration, attendance) and their impact on the effective application of these provisions in practice.

Finally, the Committee requests the Government to describe the preventive measures taken by labour inspectors with a view to remedying defects observed in plant, layout or working methods which they may have reasonable cause to believe constitute a threat to the health or safety of the workers, including measures with immediate executory force ordered by labour inspectors (Article 13).

Article 6. Status of labour inspection staff. The Committee notes that, according to the Government, the salary of labour inspectors is less than half that of tax inspectors and approximately half that of National Insurance Scheme (NIS) inspectors. The Committee draws the Government’s attention to paragraphs 204 and 209 of the 2006 General Survey on Labour Inspection, which emphasize that the levels of remuneration and career prospects of inspectors have to be such that high-quality staff are attracted, retained, and protected from any improper influence. Although the Committee is aware of the severe budgetary restrictions governments often face, it is bound to emphasize the importance it places on the treatment of labour inspectors in a way that reflects the importance and specificities of their duties and that take account of personal merit. Sometimes, very low levels of labour inspectors’ salaries, combined with the absence of career prospects, could cause inspectors to turn from the labour inspectorate towards other, more prestigious sectors of the public service or the private sector. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would specify how it ensures that the conditions of remuneration and career development of labour inspectors reflect the importance and specificities of their duties, take account of personal merit and keep them within the labour inspection system.

Article 10. Number of labour inspectors. The Committee once again requests the Government to provide detailed information on the number and distribution of labour inspectors by region, category, duties and level of qualification and to provide a copy of relevant legal texts.

Articles 11 and 16. Material and logistical resources of the labour inspectorate. The Committee notes from the Government’s report that as the labour inspectors are entitled to duty concessions, the majority have their own motor vehicle which they can use in order to carry out inspections. In its previous comments, the Committee had noted that due to a climate of violence the labour inspectorate was unable to ensure a presence in workplaces situated in certain particularly dangerous regions. The Committee once again requests the Government to provide information on the measures taken to ensure that all workplaces are inspected as often and as thoroughly as necessary including in remote areas, and to describe the method of reimbursement of travelling and incidental expenses to labour inspectors. The Committee also requests information on the measures taken to ensure the safety of inspection staff in the regions affected by the climate of violence towards public servants, with a view to effectively guaranteeing the enforcement of legal provisions relating to conditions of work.