Interim Report - Report No 80, 1965

1. 4. When this case came before it at its 38th Session in November 1964 the Committee made certain preliminary observations, which are contained in paragraphs 331 to 333 of its 78th Report, approved by the Governing Body at its 160th Session (November 1964). These paragraphs read as follows:
2. 331. The original complaint of the Greek General Confederation of Labour was contained in a telegram dated 4 September 1964 addressed directly to the I.L.O. This was supplemented by a communication dated 15 September 1964. The texts of these two communications were transmitted to the Government for its observations by two letters dated respectively 9 and 30 September 1964. By a communication dated 23 September 1964 the Government furnished certain preliminary observations on the complaint and stated that full observations would be forwarded subsequently. By a communication dated 30 October 1964 the complainants submitted additional information in support of their complaint, which was transmitted to the Government for its observations. By a communication dated 6 November 1964 the Government forwarded the observations referred to in its letter dated 23 September 1964.
3. 332. This communication, which is the Government's reply to the allegations made by the Greek General Confederation of Labour with reference to the new trade union legislation in Greece, was received by the Office on the same day as that on which the Committee met. The Committee, therefore, has not been able to examine it in detail. In view of the importance of the matter the Committee proposed to undertake at its next session an urgent examination of the new legislative provisions and of the allegations relating to the financing of trade union organisations in the light of the principles embodied in the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), ratified by Greece, and, in particular, the principles enunciated in Article 3 of that Convention, which provides that workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their Constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes, and that the public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. In the meantime, the Committee trusts that, in putting the new system into effect, the Government will take care to ensure that the principles of the Convention referred to above are not infringed.
4. 333. The Committee recommends the Governing Body to take note of the preliminary observations made in the preceding paragraph.
5. 5. Greece has ratified both the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. A. The complainants' allegations

1. 6. The complainants allege that by a series of measures culminating in the entry into force on 2 September 1964 of Legislative Decree No. 4361, around which most of C.G.T.G's grievances are centred, the Greek Government elected on 16 February 1964 has sought to place the trade union movement under government control, and to this end has interfered in a high-handed manner in trade union affairs, in complete disregard of the obligations imposed on it by Greece's ratification of Convention No. 87.
2. 7. The provisions of the legal enactment which forms the subject of the complaint Legislative Decree No. 4361-have been reviewed successively by the complainants and by the Government-the first to criticise them, the second to justify them. To begin with, however, both parties make a certain number of general preliminary observations which it would be as well to analyse before proceeding further.
3. 8. According to the complainants, during the period when the present Prime Minister was leader of the opposition, he frequently urged the General Secretary of C.G.T.G to join forces with the opposition in its struggle against the Government. His advances, declare the complainants, were rejected by C.G.T.G on the ground that such action would have been " contrary to its policy of political impartiality ". This refusal led the then leader of the opposition to set about forming the " Independent Trade Union Association of the Centre Union ", with a view to splitting the trade union movement. When the opposition party, the Centre Union Party, came to power after winning the general election of February 1964 the attacks on C.G.T.G began to take a more direct form.
4. 9. In the first place, C.G.T.G was deprived, by governmental order, of all the funds to which it had hitherto been entitled by law. Financial sanctions were then imposed on those trade union organisations which had remained faithful to C.G.T.G, while at the same time the Government increased its financial aid to those organisations which made common cause politically with the new régime. The complainants furnished, in support of this argument, specific information concerning the amounts thus allocated.
5. 10. Next, by enacting Legislative Decree No. 4361, the Government sought to ban the holding of the 15th National Congress of C.G.T.G in order to prevent the submission to the Congress of a report on the activities of the outgoing executive and the free election of a new executive.
6. 11. Finally, still making use of the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 4361, the Government endeavoured to oust the C.G.T.G executive from office and appoint a new executive composed of persons favourable towards the party in power.
7. 12. All these measures, in the view of the complainants, are designed to bring about the " establishment of a régime of governmental trade unionism in order to subject the trade union organisations to the will of the Government and to oblige them to serve the interests of the Government party ".
8. 13. In the preliminary remarks which it makes by way of a preamble to its reply the Government first of all reviews briefly the historical background to the Greek trade union movement. It attributes the present unsatisfactory situation to the vicissitudes of national political life during the past 30 years: dictatorship from 1936 to 1941, enemy occupation from 1941 to 1944, civil war from 1945 to 1950 and the abnormal situation resulting from the latter, the effects of which are still felt today.
9. 14. The Government then goes to great pains to demonstrate that the C.G.T.G leaders are neither authentic nor representative. According to the Government, the leaders of this organisation, in return for a pretence of fanatical anti-communism, obtained the financial and political backing of previous governments, and were thus able to entrench themselves in their positions of power in the trade union movement.
10. 15. The leaders of C.G.T.G, declares the Government, " had been installed and maintained in office not by democratic methods but through the use of psychological violence towards delegates, and they were aided and abetted by unlawful by-laws which discriminated against organisations with a large membership. These same provisions of the Confederation's by-laws swelled the Congress representation of the weaker organisations in a scandalous manner because these were the organisations where it was easy for the C.G.T.G leaders to gain command. This state of affairs made it possible for these leaders always to be re-elected with comfortable majorities despite the innumerable protests of the large unions who suffered thereby and of public opinion ".
11. 16. Contrary to what happens in democratic countries, C.G.T.G has therefore been characterised, in the view of the Government, by the arbitrary manner in which it has been managed, the irregular procurement of privileges, the absence of any independent action truly in the interests of the trade union movement, and a marked indifference to the real problems confronting the working class. Such a situation could hardly fail to engender keen conflict within C.G.T.G itself, culminating in the founding of an opposition movement known as the " Movement for the Restoration of Democratic Functioning within C.G.T.G.", which in its turn led to the forming of a number of splinter groups. This chaotic situation, goes on the Government, has caused the workers to lose interest in trade unionism, as evidenced by the considerable falling off in membership and by the refusal of nearly all members to pay their union dues.
12. 17. The present Government, which was elected to office by a large majority after two years of campaigning for the restoration of political and trade union freedom, declares that it felt unable to shirk what it considered to be its duty. The Government was fully aware of the role which could be played by an authentic trade union movement in the democratic, economic and social development of the country and of its responsibility to those who had placed in its hands the leadership of the nation; it had to do away with injustices which had lasted all too long, and had decided to help the workers to lay the foundations of a healthy trade union movement.
13. 18. With this end in view - and this was what lay behind Legislative Decree No. 4361 - the Government had introduced certain legal measures designed firstly to rid the country's legislation of all those provisions in contradiction with the concept of free trade unionism, and secondly to create conditions in which the workers could elect their union executives without let or hindrance and in full freedom.
14. 19. After this review of the preliminary remarks with which both the complainants and the Government have seen fit to preface their arguments concerning the disputed enactment, it is now proposed to pass on to the examination of the enactment itself in the light of the comments made thereon by both sides.
    • Examination of the Provisions of Legislative Decree No. 4361 of 2 September 1964
15. 20. Legislative Decree No. 4361 of 2 September 1964, which amends and supplements certain provisions of the legislation relating to occupational associations, has 12 sections dealing with matters of substance. Of these 12 sections only five have been criticised by the complainants. However, in order to form a general picture of the enactment as a whole, it has been deemed preferable to review it in its entirety. Attention will be turned first of all to those sections of the decree which are not called in question by the complainants, namely sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 12, which are summarised briefly below.
16. 21. Under section 1 prefects are no longer allowed to intervene in matters concerning the structure of trade unions or to depose the members of the executive of a trade union.
17. 22. Section 2 brings back into force section 21 of the Royal Decree of 15-20 May 1920, whereby the quorum at a general meeting of a union may be fixed by the by-laws of that union at a level higher than that prescribed by Act No. 281.
18. 23. Section 3 provides that the decisions of general meetings may henceforth be set aside by a magistrate's court in order to shorten the time taken to settle trade union disputes.
19. 24. Section 4 removes the former ban on trade unions acquiring real estate.
20. 25. Section 7 abolishes supervision of the financial administration of trade unions by the public authorities and ensures unhindered administration of trade union funds in accordance with the by-laws by bodies appointed by the unions themselves. It also authorises the payment of fees to members or officials handling trade union affairs.
21. 26. Section 9 does away with the obligation formerly placed on trade unions to submit to the prefects a wealth of written data concerning their members, officers, etc. The information now required constitutes a mere formality.
22. 27. Under section 12 the protection against dismissal afforded under Act No. 1803 of 1951 to presidents and secretaries of trade unions is extended to cover first and second vice-presidents and treasurers.
23. 28. The remaining sections, which have been specifically referred to by the complainants, are sections 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11.
24. 29. Section 5 lays down that all trade unions and associations of trade unions must, in conformity with their by-laws (which must be amended to that effect), be represented at the general assemblies of associations of all degrees (federations, Confederations), and must have a number of votes proportional to the number of voters among their members who have fulfilled their obligations. This proportion of the number of votes, to be established by the by-laws of each association, must be the same for all the trade unions belonging to a particular association and applicable to the total number of voting members. The number of votes of a trade union or association of trade unions may in no case exceed one-tenth of the total number of votes.
25. 30. In the complainants' view this provision, which uses legislative channels to oblige trade unions to amend their by-laws, violates the principles set forth in Article 3 of Convention No. 87 to the effect that workers' organisations should have the right to draw up their Constitutions and rules in full freedom.
26. 31. The Government, for its part, declares that it is convinced that the provisions of this section, far from constituting an infringement of freedom of association, in fact pave the way for the development of a free and democratic trade union movement.
27. 32. Hitherto, according to the Government, the executives of trade union organisations, in their anxiety to cling to power, had amended their by-laws to suit the circumstances and falsified the representation, increasing it in the case of small associations and limiting it in the case of large associations.
28. 33. According to the Government, the sole purpose of the new provisions contained in section 5 of the legislative decree is to introduce fairer and more objective criteria for determining representativeness. " By the adoption of a measure allowing for representation on a numerical basis subject to a ceiling of one-tenth, the workers' demands are met in that, while the views of the majority are not misrepresented, those of the smaller unions are not disregarded."
29. 34. Section 6 of the legislative decree lays down that trade union elections must be held under the supervision of scrutinising committees as prescribed by the by-laws. It also stipulates that a representative of the judiciary must be present at elections and ensure that the by-laws and the law are complied with. As regards the precise role of the representative of the judiciary, section 6 states that before the vote, in collaboration with the executive of the union, he must verify that all those intending to vote have paid their dues in full. After the vote it is his task to record the results in the union's register.
30. 35. In the complainants' view this section grants powers to judicial representatives whose scope is so wide that they impede the work of the general meetings of trade unions and " deprive the workers' representatives of the sovereign rights which are theirs by virtue of the rules and of their status as delegates ".
31. 36. In its observations the Government declares that, by making it incumbent upon the representative of the judiciary to verify certain data clearly specified in the text of the decree, section 6 is designed to prevent the holding of elections based on falsified figures for the number of representatives legally allowed or the membership of organisations, as has happened in the past. The Government points out that long before the promulgation of the new decree a representative of the judiciary was present at union elections without C.G.T.G ever raising a protest.
32. 37. Section 8 of the legislative decree allows the length of the term of office of a union's executive to be determined by the union's by-laws; it stipulates, however, that once it has expired the term of office may not be extended by more than one month.
33. 38. The complainants list section 8 among those which they consider to be open to criticism, but do not specify in what way, in their opinion, the provisions of this section are incompatible with the free exercise of trade union rights.
34. 39. The Government, in its observations, states that the proviso contained in section 8 was felt to be necessary " since the by-laws provided for a different extension period-three months or less-or sometimes no extension at all. There was not even a definite provision as to who should run the union at the end of a term of office."
35. 40. Section 10 declares that any trade union election taking place in accordance with statutory provisions conflicting with the provisions of the new legislation shall be null and void, and prescribes penalties to be imposed on any person organising such elections or standing as a candidate. In its observations the Government asserts that the provisions of section 10 were necessary for the implementation of section 5 and of the guarantees afforded by section 6.
36. 41. The complainants, for their part, declare that section 10, taken in conjunction with the ban imposed by section 8 on extending the term of office of trade union executives by more than one month, has had the effect of prohibiting the holding of the National Congress of C.G.T.G, planned for September 1964. It is a fact that, since it has been a practical impossibility for C.G.T.G to amend its by-laws to bring them into line with the new legislation, any congress held by it would fail to conform to the provisions of section 5 of Legislative Decree No. 4361 and would therefore, under the terms of section 10, be null and void.
37. 42. Moreover, the entry into force of Legislative Decree No. 4361 has had the following consequences for C.G.T.G. Unable to hold its Congress because of section 10, and prevented by section 8 from extending the term of office of its executive by more than one month, C.G.T.G could not help but find itself, at the end of its executive's term of office, in November 1964, in the position provided for by section 69 of the Civil Code, in virtue of which, on the expiry of the term of office of the executive of a trade union, it is open to any union to request the courts to take cognisance of the expiry of the said term of office and to appoint a new executive.
38. 43. The Government does not refute this interpretation, acknowledging that under section 69 of the Civil Code, in the event that the members of the managing council of a body corporate are not appointed by a meeting, the chairman of the court of first instance may appoint an acting council.
39. 44. The Government points out, however, that under the Constitution the chairman of the court of first instance, as a member of the judiciary, is not subject to influence by the executive power. " Consequently ", it goes on, " the Government cannot bring any pressure to bear on the said chairman at the time of such an appointment."
40. 45. The last section of Legislative Decree No. 4361 to be called in question by the complainants is section 11, which provides in substance that to participate in the general assemblies of a trade union or an association of trade unions a member must have previously fulfilled all the financial obligations laid down in the by-laws.
41. 46. The complainants do not say what they find wrong with this section. The Government, for its part, has the following observations to make.
42. 47. During the 15 years or so in which the C.G.T.G leaders have held office, they have not succeeded in doing away with the system of financing, despite the fact that it has long been the subject of complaint both by the national occupational organisations and by the international trade union movement and international bodies. The truth is, according to the Government, that these leaders made no attempt to clean up a situation which was substantially to C.G.T.G's advantage in view of the influence it had with preceding governments.
43. 48. The present Government, aware of the defects in this system of financing inherited from its predecessors, is planning to do away with it. Section 11 of Legislative Decree No. 4361 should be looked upon as the first step towards a system of free and independent financing of organisations by their own members in that it lays down the principle that no member may lawfully take part in the general meetings of a union unless he has discharged his financial responsibilities towards that union.
44. 49. In its observations, however, the Government goes on to say that it is not felt to be possible or opportune at the present time to do away completely with the system whereby workers' organisations are financed through the Workers' Club, the reason being that if the system were abolished before the workers' organisations had reached a point where they were able to meet all their financial needs out of the contributions of their members they would be deprived of their resources, and the effects of this would be felt the more heavily in that it would occur at a time when the unions were being called upon to convene general meetings in order to amend their by-laws or elect their executives in accordance with the law.
45. 50. The Government concludes its remarks on this point by stating that it has not the slightest intention of maintaining the present system for the financing of workers' organisations, which it considers to be " destructive of freedom of association ". It gives the assurance that " very shortly, along with other measures to be taken for the benefit of the workers, the question will come up of placing the financing of occupational organisations on a new and healthier footing ".
46. 51. By a communication dated 28 January 1965, the Greek Government furnished certain information concerning developments since it forwarded its observations on 6 November 1964.
47. 52. Firstly, the Government states that, having regard to the wish expressed by the Committee on Freedom of Association in paragraph 332 of its 78th Report (see paragraph 4 above), and expressed by the Governing Body itself when adopting that report, it has not since that time permitted anything to be done which might be regarded as an infringement of freedom of association.
48. 53. The Government goes on to say that since its observations were forwarded on 6 November 1964 the management committee of C.G.T.G has been established. However, adds the Government, as numerous appeals have been made to the courts by representatives of the different trade union trends with regard to the composition of the management committee, its designation is not yet definitive.
49. 54. Finally, the Government recalls that, in its earlier communications, it indicated that it would gratefully accept any assistance of the I.L.O in dealing with the problem of the reorganisation of the Greek trade union movement. In this connection the Government states: ". the best procedure for permitting a more systematic examination of the complex matters raised by the complaint against the Greek Government would be to refer the case of the complaint of C.G.T.G to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association set up in 1950 by the Governing Body of the I.L.O for the purpose of investigating complaints addressed to the I.L.O. The Government, being very anxious that a complete and objective examination of the trade union situation should be made and desiring at the same time to establish the conditions necessary for the reorganisation of the trade union movement by the workers themselves, would consent with pleasure to the said Commission visiting Greece in order to examine the matter."