Interim Report - Report No 76, 1964

1. 354. The complaint of the Union of Congolese Workers is contained in a cablegram addressed directly to the I.L.O on 19 October 1963, supported by a letter bearing the same date. Both these communications were transmitted to the Government for its observations by letters dated respectively 25 October and 20 November 1963. The Government replied by communications dated 3 January and 12 February 1964.
2. 355. The Congo (Leopoldville) has not ratified either the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. A. The complainants' allegations

1. 356. The complainants allege that on 15 October 1963, while on a tour of inspection of the local sections of the Union of Congolese Workers, the National President of that organisation, Mr. Raymond Beya, was arrested, arbitrarily imprisoned and maltreated by the provincial authorities of North Kivu.
2. 357. In its reply of 3 January 1964 the Government states that the Union of Congolese Workers has not yet been approved by the Government as an occupational organisation and that accordingly it cannot be permitted to engage in trade union activities. It explains that section 2 of the Decree of 25 January 1957 respecting the exercise of the right of association by the inhabitants of the Congo provides that only such associations shall be authorised as have been approved in the manner prescribed by order, while section 6 lays down penalties for any person participating in the operation of an occupational association which acts unlawfully, particularly one which acts without having been approved.
3. 358. The above-mentioned legislation, declares the Government, requiring trade unions to be officially approved, is still in force "pending abrogation and-if appropriate-replacement by provisions suited to present circumstances ". According to the Government its object is to shelter emerging trade unions, in the interests of their members, from political movements. In practice, however, states the Government, occupational associations are permitted to operate as such before obtaining official approval, provided that they do not disturb public order.
4. 359. As for the movement entitled "Union of Congolese Workers", the existence of which, according to the Government, has only been known to the authorities for about a year, there is nothing so far to indicate that it is a genuine occupational association-i.e. an organisation established at the common desire of a group of workers and animated by an authentic trade union spirit. It may well be, continues the Government, that it is merely a "business office" with nothing trade unionist about it but the name, "not belonging to any labour movement and addressing the workers with the object of procuring jobs for its founders ".
5. 360. The Government declares-also in its communication of 3 January 1964 that it is unaware at present whether the alleged events have really occurred. Moreover, it goes on, even if they have, it cannot be assumed a priori that Mr. Beya was arrested by reason of activities directed towards the defence of the workers ; such an arrest "may have been due to some specifically unlawful act, for membership of a trade union cannot confer any privilege or immunity and, if an unlawful act has been committed while its author was engaged in trade union activity the authorities are entitled and indeed obliged to take cognisance of the act, to investigate it and to prosecute its author ".
6. 361. The Government states in its communication of 3 January 1964 that it has invited the local authorities to report on the facts, and in particular on the reasons for the arrest, if it did in fact take place. A similar invitation has been addressed to the judicial authorities. The Government undertakes to inform the I.L.O of any developments in connection with this correspondence as soon as it is acquainted with them itself.
7. 362. The Government concludes this first communication by declaring that it is already in a position to assure the Office that Mr. Beya is now free.
8. 363. In a second communication dated 12 February 1964, which was received, too late for the Committee to be able to consider the substance at its 36th Session (20-21 February 1964), the Government provided the additional information forecast in its first letter : the character of this information is indicated in paragraph 361 above.
9. 364. It proceeds from the second letter that Mr. Beya was sentenced in virtue of, a judgment made in due form by the police court at Butembo on 17 October 1963, like other police courts (which exist in each territory and in each place classified as a "town") it is competent in respect of offences for which not more than two months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than 2,000 francs or both can be inflicted. It proceeds also from the information furnished by the Government that Mr. Beya, having served his sentence, was released on 19 December 1963.

B. B. The Committee's conclusions

1. 365. The Committee notes that although in its latter communication the Government refers to a judgment which led to a term of imprisonment for the person concerned, it does not specify, as expected (see paragraph 361 above), the reasons invoked by the court for sentencing Mr. Beya.
2. 366. The Committee recalls in this regard that, in all instances in which matters relating to a case before it were the subject of national judicial proceedings, provided these had been conducted in a manner ensuring due process of law, it has considered that the decision in such proceedings might provide it with information of assistance in appreciating the allegations made, and has therefore decided to adjourn examination of the case until it was in possession of the result of the said proceedings.

367. The Committee considers it advisable to follow the same course in the present instance : to recommend the Governing Body to ask the Government to be good enough to communicate the text of the judgment which led to Mr. Beya's imprisonment, and that of the reasons on which the judgment was based, and meanwhile to adjourn examination of the case.