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Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

Morocco

Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) (Ratification: 1958)
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129) (Ratification: 1979)

Other comments on C129

Observation
  1. 2022
  2. 2010
  3. 2003
  4. 2001
Direct Request
  1. 2022
  2. 2014
  3. 2011
  4. 2007
  5. 2005
  6. 2003
  7. 2001
  8. 1998
  9. 1996
  10. 1993
  11. 1992
  12. 1991
  13. 1990

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In order to provide a comprehensive view of the issues relating to the application of the ratified Conventions on labour inspection, the Committee considers it appropriate to examine Conventions Nos 81 (labour inspection) and 129 (labour inspection in agriculture) together.
The Committee notes the observations of the Democratic Confederation of Labour (CDT) and the National Union of Labour in Morocco (UNTM), transmitted with the Government’s reports in 2017 concerning both Conventions.
Article 3(1) and (2) of Convention No. 81 and Article 6(1) and (3) of Convention No. 129. Additional duties of labour inspectors. Further to its previous comment, the Committee notes that, according to the information contained in the annual labour inspection report in Morocco 2020 - 2021, labour inspectors play a very important role in the resolution of individual and collective disputes, under sections 532 and 551 of the Labour Code. In 2021, labour inspectors carried out 24,860 inspections compared to 33,362 in 2018. In addition, only 991 inspections were carried out in occupational safety and health, compared to 2,488 in 2018. However, labour inspectors examined 56,509 individual disputes and took measures to prevent the outbreak of 1,234 collective disputes in 2021. The UNTM indicates in its observations that the function of conciliator is performed to the detriment of law enforcement, and therefore tends to exacerbate the number of individual and collective labour disputes.
The Committee notes that the time spent by labour inspectors on conciliation may be to the detriment of the performance of their primary duties, especially when resources are limited. In this respect, the Committee recalls that, according to Article 3(2) of Convention No. 81 and Article 6(3) of Convention No. 129, other duties entrusted to labour inspectors should not interfere with the performance of their primary duties. The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures to remedy this situation and to ensure that, in accordance with Article 3(2) of Convention No. 81 and Article 6(3) of Convention No. 129, the additional functions of conciliation entrusted to labour inspectors do not interfere with the performance of their primary duties. In this respect, it requests the Government to continue to provide information on the time spent on the primary duties within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Convention No. 81 and Article 6(1) of Convention No. 129 in relation to the other functions of labour inspection.
Article 6 of Convention No. 81 and Article 8 of Convention No. 129. Independence of labour inspectors of improper external influences. The Committee notes the Government’s indication in its report that, between 2014 - 2016, there were six legal proceedings against labour inspectors’ decisions and reports under section 17 of Dahir No. 1-58-008 on the general statute of the public service, one of which had been resolved by court of first instance with an acquittal, and the other five of which were before the competent courts. The Committee requests the Government to continue to provide detailed information on the practical application of section 17 of Dahir No. 1-58-008, in particular on the legal proceedings undertaken against labour inspectors in recent years (alleged offences, legal provisions invoked, duration of proceedings and so forth) and their outcome. It also requests the Government to specify the criminal penalties that labour inspectors may face relating to actions or measures taken in the performance of their duties, as well as the corresponding legal provisions that provide for such penalties.
Articles 12 and 15(c) of Convention No. 81 and Articles 16 and 20(c) of Convention No. 129. Confidentiality regarding the source of complaints during inspections; inspections without prior notice. The Committee notes that the Government has not provided any new information in this regard. The Committee therefore once again requests the Government to take measures to introduce a specific legal obligation of confidentiality, by providing that labour inspectors shall treat as absolutely confidential the source of any complaint bringing to their notice a defect or breach of legal provisions and shall give no intimation to the employer or his representative that a visit of inspection was made in consequence of the receipt of such a complaint, as stipulated in Article 15(c) of Convention No. 81 and Article 20(c) of Convention No. 129.Recalling that confidentiality is only possible in practice if the inspection method used includes a considerable number of routine inspections, the Committee once again requests the Government to provide statistics on the number of inspections, indicating the type of each inspection (routine visits, visits to monitor the application of enforcement orders, visits pursuant to a complaint and so forth).
Articles 13, 17 and 18 of Convention No. 81 and Articles 18, 22, 23 and 24 of Convention No. 129. 1. Prosecution of violations and effectively applied penalties. Further to its previous comment, the Committee notes that, according to the statistics contained in the 2020–21 inspection report, the number of reports drawn up remains low compared to the number of violations detected. In 2021, there were 227,830 observations on the application of the legislation in the industry, trade and services sectors, with 76 reports drawn up noting 1,094 violations. The Committee also notes the observations of the CDT that there is a lack of follow-up to reports of violations. In addition, the UNTM indicates in its observations that there is a lack of information on the follow-up to legal actions and to the various obstacles to the performance of inspectors’ duties. The Committee requests the Government to continue to provide statistical information on the observations made, the violations noted and the reports drawn up by labour inspectors. It also requests the Government to provide further information on the follow-up to these observations in cases where reports are not drawn up, including areas of compliance that were addressed and remedies applied, and the penalties imposed.
2. Supervisory activities of inspectors in agriculture and action taken on safety and health injunctions and breaches of the legislation. Further to its previous comment on Convention No. 129, the Committee notes that the Government does not provide any information on the action taken on safety and health injunctions and breaches of the legislation, including for failure to execute injunctions issued to eliminate risk to the workers’ safety and health (section 543 of the Labour Code), or the recommendation (section 545 of the Labour Code) for the prosecution of employers in breach of the regulations or an order to take preventive action. The Committee once again requests the Government to provide information on the results of the exercise of labour inspectors’ powers of injunction and of initiating legal proceedings, as defined in the above legislation.
The Committee is raising other matters in a request addressed directly to the Government.
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