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Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2007, published 97th ILC session (2008)

Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) - Belgium (Ratification: 1957)

Other comments on C081

Observation
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The Committee notes the Government’s report and the legislative, practical and statistical information on the functioning of the labour inspection system.

1.  Labour inspection methods aimed at promoting a culture of compliance with the law. According to the Government, the priority areas of labour inspection are occupational safety and health. Furthermore, the regulations concerning welfare at work constitute the basis for inspection activity, and the main instrument for contributing to a better social policy is the improvement of these regulations. The Committee notes with interest the announcement of new inspection methods aimed at fostering compliance with the regulations concerning welfare at work. According to the Government, many employers and enterprises have a positive attitude towards these regulations. In the view of the Government, it is entirely normal and justifiable for public money to be set aside for the provision of staff and funding to assist employers in the proper observance of the regulations, if they are not properly informed of their obligations and do not have a clear understanding of the specific implications of the new regulations. Inspection activities are adapted in the light of indicators such as complaints, serious industrial accidents, occupational diseases and requests for mediation. The initial reaction to these indicators being an attitude of positive encouragement, it is nevertheless considered essential, without discouraging willing employers, to adopt a radical approach towards clearly recalcitrant parties, using appropriate instruments such as the imposition of work stoppages combined with the reporting of contraventions, for example during controls on construction sites and sites where asbestos is being removed.

With regard to recalcitrant employers, the Government’s opinion is that only intensive and sustained inspection can change their attitudes and that, although it is logical that the capacity of the inspectorate increases as unwillingness to cooperate increases, it is also morally unjustifiable that this additional capacity should be paid for by the community. Offenders should consequently be made to pay for additional inspections resulting from their unsocial attitude. With this in mind, a first and possibly a second inspection on the same regulations would be free of charge. From the third inspection onwards, the offending party would have to pay for each inspection which it caused, in proportion to the cost. The application of a method combining injunctions and the payment of a deposit where the inspector fears that the employer will not comply with agreements aimed at rectifying the infringement is also worthy of serious consideration. This deposit, which would be refunded when compliance with the injunction was confirmed, would be confiscated in the event of non-compliance and transferred to the insurers, with a view to building up funds so that enterprises which make serious efforts at prevention can be rewarded. The additional administrative burden generated by this inspection method can be limited, according to the Government, through collaboration with the industrial accidents fund or the occupational diseases fund. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide a copy of any legislative text or regulation adopted with a view to the implementation of the new methods of inspection outlined above, together with figures on their impact in practice.

2. Article 5(b) of the Convention. Collaboration between the inspection services and employers for the protection of workers from subcontracting enterprises.  The Committee notes with interest that measures have been adopted via a “prime contractors/subcontractors” safety and health charter, which has been drawn up by a number of employers’ organizations and the aim of which is to achieve optimum integration of safety and health aspects for all subcontracting work through collaboration between the prime contractor and the subcontractor. The principles of prevention, integration, involvement, cooperation, communication and coordination are all applied in the charter. A “contractors’ work” inspection index, the basis of which is chapter IV of the Act of 4 August 1996 on the welfare of workers during the performance of their work, is used to evaluate the commitment of employers to the welfare of external workers who work in their premises, as well as that of the direct employers of these workers. Applications to join this charter are sent to the Department for the Monitoring of Industrial Welfare, which certifies that the applicant enterprise has not been the subject, in the six months proceeding the application, of a definitive conviction, an administrative fine or a work stoppage order relating to circumstances occurring during the previous three years which has not been cancelled by the labour inspectorate. This certificate entitles the enterprise to register its name on the website http://www.chartedesecurite.be, thus enhancing its image through its positioning as a decent, reliable enterprise investing in the safety and health of workers. It can use the charter logo on its correspondence, bid documents, etc., and it is less liable to visits from the labour inspectorate, since the latter is aware of its efforts in the areas of safety and health at work. The result is fewer industrial accidents and a reduction in insurance premiums.

3. Article 5(a). Cooperation between the labour inspection services and other organizations with a view to better application of the legislation. The Committee notes with interest that the inspection services cooperate with other supervisory bodies which have competence in fields other than welfare at work, following an equally radical approach to violations of a less serious nature or committed in other sectors. Such cooperation consists of attracting the attention of such bodies with a view to identify attitudes that systematically seek to evade the law. Social fraud, for example, is a good indicator of general fraud.

The Committee would be grateful if the Government would continue to supply information on developments in methods relating to the functioning of the labour inspection system and indicate the impact of their implementation, in statistical terms, on the general situation regarding conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work.

The Committee is sending a request concerning another point directly to the Government.

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