Report in which the committee requests to be kept informed of development - REPORT_NO338, November 2005

604. The complaint is contained in a communication from the National Federation of Telephone and Telecommunication Workers’ Unions of Chile (FENATEL) dated May 2004. The Government sent its observations in communications dated 12 April and 21 September 2005.

1. 605. Chile has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainants’ allegations

1. 606. In its communication of May 2004, the National Federation of Telephone and Telecommunication Workers’ Unions of Chile (FENATEL) complains of violations of trade union rights in the following companies: Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile S.A., Telefónica Gestión de Servicios Compartidos Chile S.A., Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile Equipo Servicios, Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile, Isapre S.A., Telefónica Empresas CTC de Chile S.A. and Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile-Transmisiones Regionales S.A., all of which are part of the CTC de Chile Group, and/or for the purposes of labour law constitute a single company and, in consequence, a single employer. According to the complainant organization, the State of Chile has not adopted the measures necessary to implement in full the provisions of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of association. More specifically, FENATEL alleges that during the collective bargaining process in the defendant companies in May and June 2002, the workers engaged in a legal strike which lasted 28 days. The companies hired replacement workers without authorization, for which they were sanctioned by the Inspectorate of Labour although only the recruitment of a few workers was sanctioned (the bulk of the replacement workers, in their hundreds, left the premises when the inspectors arrived). The companies prevented access by trade union leaders to the company premises, etc., in respect of which a complaint concerning anti-trade union practices was made by the municipal Inspectorate of Labour under the Directorate of Labour in Santiago Nor-Oriente, which is now being heard in the Fifth Labour Court in Santiago, case No. 5295-2003. In addition, during the industrial dispute, Telefónica was supported by the forces of law. The police cordoned off the boundaries and protected the entry of the workers who were illegally replacing the striking workers. As there was no agreement between the parties, the collective bargaining in 2002 ended when the workers invoked their right under article 369 of the Labour Code to force the company to sign a new collective agreement with the same terms as those in the contracts in force when the draft was presented. Under the law, the new contract would remain in force for 18 months. According to FENATEL, since then, the companies planned and pursued a systematic policy of anti-trade union practices, which included the following objectives:
2. – To drastically reduce wage costs, reducing basic wages by changing the organization of work and eliminating significant benefits from collective contracts, some of them longstanding in the company. These included a long-service increment in all cases of 40 days per year worked; payment of a fixed sum of up to 7,500,000,000 Chilean pesos (seven thousand five hundred million) to be shared annually among the workers in the group; performance-based incentives for achieving targets; staff medical service and others. For this, they needed to prevent the trade unions having renewed resort to the provisions of article 369 of the Labour Code, since that maintained unchanged the benefits that they wished to eliminate.
3. – To destroy the trade unions which had engaged in the strike and constituted an obstacle to reductions in wages and collective benefits, or, in the worst case, bring about changes in the trade union leadership. The leaders who had led the strike in 2002 were to be replaced by acquiescent leaders who would not oppose the plundering which the planned wage reduction would mean.
4. – To favour, in whatever way, a trade union organization which would support company policy. That organisation turned out to be the National Inter-company Union of Administrative and Specialist Workers in the Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile S.A., subsidiaries, successors, branches and others (SINTELFI).
5. 607. FENATEL states that the planned objective was achieved in full, over a period of four months (July-October 2003), in which the FENATEL unions were stripped of some 90 per cent of their members. Those members joined SINTELFI which negotiated, under wretched conditions, on behalf of rather more than 1,600 workers. Put in concrete terms: the trade union SINTELFI increased its membership from 6.8 per cent of all unionized workers in July 2003 to 80 per cent in October 2003. In other words, it increased the number of its members from 370 in July to over 1,800 members in November 2003.
6. 608. The loss of membership was on such a scale that the FENATEL unions cannot fulfil their statutory purposes. As in the main they are inter-company unions, they had traditionally established negotiating teams from their members within each group company which required a quorum to engage in collective bargaining, a quorum which now cannot be achieved.
7. 609. The Chairman of the Board of Telefónica, its general manager, its personnel manager and other senior executives were personally involved in the planning and execution of the anti-trade union campaign. In a letter of 9 September 2002, sent to all workers in the group, the Chairman of the Board made no secret of his animosity towards the trade union leaders who had led the strike. Those executives covered the entire country, meeting directly with unionized workers in the group, calling on them to replace the FENATEL leadership by others who were more “reasonable”. In these meetings, they addressed matters concerning industrial relations within the companies:
8. – the need to reduce wage costs to make the companies more competitive, which meant reducing basic wages and abolishing key benefits in collective contracts and prevent workers demanding the application of article 369 of the Labour Code in the 2003 collective bargaining round, which in turn meant they needed to bring about changes in the trade union leadership;
9. – they constantly denigrated officials of trade unions affiliated to the United Workers Front (FUT) (now almost all of them members of FENATEL), blaming them for the strike and the damage to the company caused by the strike. According to the Chairman of the Board of the holding, it was a case of intransigent workers who did not know how to bargain collectively and did not have any negotiating capacity and were responsible for the serious financial situation. The purpose of meeting with the staff was to inspire fear among the workers that failure to accept the measures to take the company forward would imperil the continuity of the employment relationship, which required docile leaders close to the employer.
10. 610. In addition, executives and workers of the Telefónica companies put direct pressure on workers belonging to trade unions affiliated to the complainant organization. The pressure consisted, among other things, of: (a) workers being offered additional benefits (which were not offered to trade unions in the complainant organization) if they engaged in prior collective bargaining with SINTELFI, or (b) threats of dismissal if they did not give up membership of their organizations and join SINTELFI. The threats were in some cases veiled, insinuating that workers were putting their future source of work at risk if they remained a member of a FENATEL union, or in other cases, bare-faced and direct: “either you leave the union you now belong to and join SINTELFI or you will be sacked”.
11. 611. Apart from two officials with trade union responsibilities, 60 workers of the Human Resources Management Department gave up their trade union membership. Executives of the company participated directly and personally in the campaign of pressures and threats to bring this about.
12. 612. According to FENATEL, during the 2003 collective bargaining round, the group companies openly favoured SINTELFI, to which it made offers that were substantially better than those made to the FENATEL member unions. The current collective agreement covers the great majority of unionized workers (some 1,900 and reduces the wages of some workers by over 66 per cent).
13. 613. In addition, the defendant companies have consistently failed to honour collective labour instruments. Thus, for example, an application is being heard in the courts for payment of the sum of 7,500,000,000 pesos (seven thousand five hundred million) which was to be shared among all the corporation’s workers under clause 4.2 of the 1998 collective agreement. Another case involves failure to honour clause 28.2 of the current collective agreement (supplementary health insurance). Other applications are being heard for failure to comply with the stability pact known as the Acuerdo Básico de Confianza (ABC) (Basic Trust Agreement) (clause 50 of the collective agreement). FENATEL annexed to its complaint copies of the applications and copies of ten investigation reports relating to ten other complaints to the Inspectorate of Labour, for non-compliance with collective agreements in force in the company.
14. 614. The pressure by the company on the trade union officials was expressed, among other things, in the constant insistence that the benefit of devoting themselves full time to union matters which had been in effect for years should be abolished. For months, the personnel management sent letters to trade union officials, stating their intention to terminate the agreement whereby workers’ representatives were released to provide services and work full time for the union. Finally, the pressure became unsustainable and all the FENATEL officials, apart from three, had to resume their functions in the company on 26 April 2004. In the last collective bargaining round, the companies refused special leave to FENATEL officials who were not released to provide services, while officials of the other unions received all the necessary leave to pursue the bargaining process.
15. 615. The companies concerned have dismissed thousands of workers in the last four years. But the choice of dismissed workers was based on anti-trade union criteria. FENATEL explains that its unions were linked with their members through an internal structure which envisages the existence of a body of delegates. These are members who are distinguished by their active participation in trade union activities. The fact is that in reducing their workforce, companies took special care to dismiss almost all the body of delegates. FENATEL mentions the names of 42 workers.
16. B. The Government’s reply
17. 616. In its communications of 12 April and 21 September 2005, the Government states that the State of Chile has a series of laws which recognize, promote and protect the rights set out in Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, and that anti-trade union and unfair practices in the course of collective bargaining are particularly singled out for sanction. Likewise, Law No. 19759 of 2001 listed unfair and anti-trade union practices more precisely, increased the amount of fines and granted increased powers to the National Directorate of Labour allowing it to be a party to court proceedings on matters related to this subject. Under national legislation:
18. – the courts have the power to determine conduct as anti-trade union, without prejudice to the intervention of the Inspectorate of Labour as set out in article 292 of the Labour Code;
19. a. branches of the Inspectorate of Labour in the National Directorate of Labour have a duty to report facts which they consider to be anti-trade union or unfair practices and there is a presumption in law that the accompanying investigation report is true;
20. b. the reporting branch of the Inspectorate of Labour may be a party to the proceedings resulting from complaints of anti-trade union or unfair practices.
21. 617. As regards the specific allegations by the complainant organization, the Government states in relation to the alleged replacement of workers involved in the legal 28-day strike in 2002, in the context of the collective bargaining process, that after its investigation, the Inspectorate of Labour found that striking workers had been replaced before the expiry of the 15 days required by law. As the employers were not empowered to hire replacement workers, the Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile S.A., Telefónica Gestión de Servicios Compartidos Chile S.A., Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile Equipo Servicios, Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile, Isapre Istel S.A and Telefónica Empresas CTC de Chile S.A. were fined the sum of 69 monthly tax units, equivalent to 1,721,700 Chilean pesos under administrative proceedings.
22. 618. As regards the allegation that trade union officials were prevented from carrying out their functions, the Government states that the Inspectorate of Labour instigated a complaint in respect of anti-trade union practice, in case No. 5295-2003 in the 5th Labour Court of Santiago. On 22 July 2004, the judge in that court upheld the complaint and sentenced the defendant company to a fine equivalent to 120 monthly tax units. The sentence specifically states that the defendant had engaged in anti-trade union practices, preventing free access by officials to the company’s premises, and “acts of interference” in favour of trade unions which were not members of FENATEL.
23. 619. As regards the alleged attitude of the Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile Group favouring a trade union organization, the Government indicates that it emerged from a series of investigation reports that there had been a series of conduct favouring some organizations to the detriment of others, a situation that was evident in the following ways: holding of prior negotiations, making offers of higher amounts than those offered to trade unions belonging to FENATEL; different treatment of FENATEL officials and those of SINTELFI and civil engineers and failure to recognize trade union leave.
24. 620. As regards the alleged pressure on workers belonging to FENATEL to make them give up their membership, the Government states that in the investigation carried out by the Inspectorate of Labour, a large decrease in members in the personnel department was noted (of 42 members, only two retained their membership) as well as the disqualification of the officials by the company, letters addressed to workers recommending them to give up benefits acquired through collective bargaining and open calls to the workers by the company to give up their membership of the trade union and negotiate individually.
25. 621. As regards the allegation that the company terminated the agreement whereby trade union officials enjoyed trade union leave and were released from their duties, and required them to resume their functions, the Government states that the investigation by the Inspectorate of Labour found that from 1991 to 1997, the company gave full-time trade union leave with pay to FENATEL officials René Tabilo, Ricardo Campos, Pedro Sandoval and Fredy Escobar to allow them to devote all their time to their trade union work. According to the company’s report, through two letters from the personnel management, the workers were told that in the light of the new financial situation of the company and its subsidiaries, the situation of trade union leave would be reviewed. Finally, the company informed the officials on 15 April 2004 that from 21 April 2004 trade union leave would be abolished, except as laid down by law (which must be not less than six hours, or eight if the organization has over 250 workers, as laid down in article 294 of the Labour Code). This point was one of the matters included in the complaint of anti-trade union practices by the administrative authority in the Fifth Labour Court in Santiago, which gave an unfavourable ruling to the union on this point. The sentence was appealed and the proceedings have not yet concluded.
26. 622. The Government points out that the matters in the complaint formulated by FENATEL were investigated, and some are the subject of pending court proceedings. The Government states that it will inform the Committee of the progress of the court cases and includes the text of the judgement of the Fifth Labour Court of Santiago which states as follows:
27. (…)
28. 4. In the light of the foregoing and after careful analysis of the related background, this court considers that the company had engaged in anti-trade union practices, prevention of free access by officials to company premises, “acts of interference” by favouring trade unions that do not belong to FENATEL and discriminating against the latter by encouraging its members to give up their membership, through disadvantageous proposals for agreements and meetings in which it inspired fear of losing their jobs in those who clung to the provisions of art. 369 of the Labour Code, specifically the members of the complainant trade unions. This conduct must be sanctioned in that it constitutes a violation of the free exercise of trade union activity.
29. 5. Although the hiring of workers during the strike was found to have occurred, it will not be sanctioned in this court, as the Inspectorate of Labour has already sanctioned the conduct with a fine and it has not been shown that the defendant has persisted with violation subsequently. The foregoing in application of the principle of “double jeopardy”.
30. 6. The remainder of the evidence does not change the above argument;
31. For these considerations and further given what is laid down in the above-mentioned decisions and the provisions of articles 289 and following of the Labour Code, it is declared:
32. I. That the complaint is upheld only insofar as the defendant must cease its anti-trade union conduct, allow free access to FENATEL trade union officials and any other trade union official to the company’s premises, including those situated at 48, Calle San Martin; and must also cease any form of communication intended to inspire fear of loss of jobs relating to circumstances which arise from agreements which were or are legally agreed with the trade unions in the relevant collective bargaining processes. It must also ensure that it does not act in any way such as to discriminate between the various trade unions and especially that it does not encourage members to leave trade unions which for one reason or another are inconvenient to the company.
33. 623. The Government states that 22 union representatives have been dismissed in 2001, and 17 in 2003, due to staff reductions which affected 1,593 workers. According to the Government, fines were imposed in this respect (ten fiscal units and 7.5 million pesos) for violation of the collective agreement.
34. 624. The Government annexes the following comments by the Compañía Telefónica de Chile (CTC) on the complaint, according to which Telefónica CTC de Chile and its subsidiaries have 22 trade unions, some of which are grouped into three federations, representing 2,650 workers. Of those, only six unions have more than 100 members and 11 have less than 30 persons each, in several cases representing less than 1 per cent of the company. The National Federation of Telephone and Telecommunication Workers’ Unions of Chile (FENATEL), in particular, consists of five trade unions, representing a total of 120 workers. CTC de Chile indicates that its results, after profits of over 300 million dollars in 1996 and 1997, turned into losses in 1999, falling to a loss of almost 200 million dollars in 2000. In subsequent years, the company has constantly sought to balance its books in a market where revenues continue to fall, despite everyone’s efforts to diversify products and improve productivity.In the first half of 2001, given the poor results, Telefónica was forced to dismiss some 1,200 workers. However, although under collective agreements those workers received compensation much higher than the legal minimum (40 days per year and without ceilings for long service), it was considered highly inadequate by the officials and had a very negative effect on industrial relations. In mid-2002, collective bargaining was opened with the company’s 22 trade unions. Agreements were reached with 11 of them, but not the other 11, among them the FENATEL unions. In fact, those trade unions decided on a strike, which they maintained for 28 days, at a time when the unions took the option of maintaining the same benefits that they had possessed previously (article 369 of the Labour Code). The law provides that this option may only be invoked by trade unions, at any time before or during the strike.
35. 625. During the strike, there were all kinds of malicious acts, damage to executives’ cars, threats (even at home) to officials and workers who had concluded agreements, attacks against offices, cutting of fibre optic cables at various points in the country, including those of other companies. In all, there were over 150 attacks on company facilities.
36. 626. The 11 trade unions which went on strike took different routes. The five FENATEL members and two others chose to continue the path of “not talking”, and the other five chose the bargaining route. The bargaining began in June 2003 and agreements were reached in October 2003.
37. 627. Throughout this entire process there was no anti-trade union practice. The workers could freely choose between the option of “seeking agreement” and the option of “not negotiating”. The trade unions which signed the agreement no doubt reflected the opinion of the great majority of the workers who demonstrated that desire by changing to the various unions which were talking. In this way, FENATAL, which had 490 members in June 2003 was reduced to 144 in November 2003. Thus the massive flight of members from the FENATEL unions is not the product of underhand actions by the company, but the legitimate exercise of freedom of association by workers who understood that to defend their rights and interests at that time, the path of dialogue and flexibility was more appropriate and compatible with the company’s circumstances. Once the process had been concluded with the great majority of the workers, the trade unions belonging to FENATEL were offered the chance to sign the same agreement, an offer they rejected, preferring once again to rely on article 369 of the Labour Code.
38. 628. CTC de Chile adds that it is not true that the company hired replacement workers. Indeed, the Inspectorate of Labour imposed a fine in respect of 12 people (there were over 1,900 workers on strike) and the company asked for the fine to be reviewed on the grounds that it was an error. With regard to preventing access by officials to premises during the time of the strike, it should be noted that Chilean law prohibits workers from entering company premises during a strike. It is not true that CTC de Chile was supported by the forces of order. It is true that the police maintained a constant presence in the area to prevent acts of vandalism and to allow executives and workers who were not on strike to circulate freely. As regards the company strategy alleged by the complainant organization, CTC de Chile states that it cannot be an anti-trade union practice to agree new contractual conditions with trade unions. It was quite true that it was sought to reduce wage costs in the face of the impossibility of maintaining conditions which bore no relation to the market under conditions where the company had been making losses for several years in succession.
39. 629. It is not true that there was a desire to “destroy the trade unions”, or “look for docile officials”. It was always commented how important the trade unions were and how they should effectively represent the true interests of the workers. The workers chose freely, with all the information before them. It is not true that it was sought to favour a particular organization. The fact is that the 22 trade unions were invited to talk – some wished to do so, others did not.
40. 630. The figures provided for the SINTELFI union are wrong. The correct figures are that in July 2003 it had 744 members (19 per cent of the unionized workers) and in November 2003 this had increased to 1,586 workers (39 per cent). FENATEL was reduced to 120 members, because its members, using their right of freedom of association enshrined in the law, preferred to be represented by other organizations. Furthermore, FENATEL has problems of obtaining a quorum to function, due to the fact that it has retained a five-union structure. The smallest of them has four members, and the next, 16 members.
41. 631. This group of trade unions is confusing the right of any employer to explain in detail to its workers the company’s situation and its consequences, with anti-trade union practices. The meetings took place in a climate of frankness and transparency with many workers and were attended by officials of the various trade unions. It is absolutely wrong that trade union officials were blamed for the economic crisis in Telefónica or that different financial benefits were offered to members of one union or another. In fact, they all had the same option. Some accepted it.
42. 632. It is also untrue that the personnel management department pressured its workers to give up their trade union membership. For one thing, the department has 30 staff (and not 60 as stated by FENATEL) of whom three were trade union members in September 2002. In December 2003, there were two trade union members. If we also consider the staff working in the T-Gestiona company, there were 52 people, of whom 22 were trade union members in September 2002. In December 2003, there were 47 staff, and 20 trade union members.
43. 633. The comparison made by FENATEL between the benefits provided to SINTELFI and those received by itself is clearly incorrect, since it compares the final position of SINTELFI with the initial offer to the FENATEL unions. Obviously a final offer is not the same as an initial offer.
44. 634. Interpreting clauses in collective agreements in different ways does not mean anti-trade union practice to the extent that it is applied consistently to all the trade unions. Simply, there are different interpretations, and these are clarified as appropriate in the courts. In fact, in the case mentioned by FENATEL for alleged non-payment of 7,500,000,000 Chilean pesos, the company won its case against one of the trade unions and has lost now another in the Court of Appeal and a final decision is awaited in the Supreme Court.
45. 635. The company has 22 trade unions, over 100 officials and over 20 who only work on trade union activities, or approximately one full-time official for every 200 workers. In the FENATEL case, which in December 2003 represented 194 workers, it had eight officials devoted entirely to trade union activities. By any standard, this seems an excessive number and lends itself to clear abuses such as those by Mr. Carlos Burgos Abarca, an official who decided not even to go to the union office, receiving a wage without doing anything for the company or the workers.
46. 636. It seems excessive to allow 15 FENATEL officials to work full time in a bargaining process when they represent a little over 150 workers. Compare the case of SINTELFI, where five officials represent over 1,000 people.
47. 637. Indeed, the persons mentioned by FENATEL were dismissed. What the trade unions do not mention is that they never provided a list of delegates or the trade union statutes to the company. If some names coincide with possible “delegates”, these would not be those contemplated in the Labour Code as having trade union office, but perhaps internal delegates whose status in the company was not notified.

C. The Committee’s conclusions

1. 638. The Committee observes that the complainant organizations presented the following allegations: hiring of workers by the Compañía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile S.A. and other group holding companies to replace strikers; anti-trade union practices during the 2002 strike, including presence of the police and the fact that the companies prevented access by trade union officials to company premises; interference to ensure that trade union officials were replaced and to favour a trade union which was supportive of the company, leading to a large loss of members by the trade unions affiliated to the complainant organization, which suffered from an anti-trade union campaign by the company executives; and pressure consisting of economic benefits to workers who bargained through the trade union favourable to the employer as well as threats of dismissals of those refusing to give up their membership, giving preference to the trade union supportive of the company in the 2003 collective bargaining round; systematic failure to honour collective agreements in force; dismissals for anti-trade union motives, including of trade union officials (according to the Government, 22 union delegates were dismissed in 2001, and 17 in 2003, due to staff reductions which affected 1,593 workers); and loss of full-time leave for trade union duties.
2. 639. The Committee notes the comments of the Compañía Telefónica de Chile on the complaint in which it points out the difficult economic situation faced by the group holding companies and the fact that it reached agreement with 16 out of the 22 trade unions in the company reflecting the choice of the great majority of workers in relation to FENATEL’s “no bargaining” option. According to the CTC de Chile, the “no bargaining” option explains the massive loss of members from the FENATEL trade unions (which now has only 120 members) and the increase in the members of SINTELFI (to 1,586 members). CTC de Chile denies the alleged anti-trade union practices and that it pressured workers to give up their membership. It also states that the right of any employer to explain in detail to the workers the situation in the company must not be confused with anti-trade union practices. The company emphasizes finally that the presence of the police was to prevent acts of vandalism and that during the strike there were 150 attacks against company facilities, cutting of fibre optic cables, damage to vehicles, etc. In addition, according to the company, with regard to the failure to fulfil collective agreements, court decisions had sometimes been favourable to the company and sometimes to the trade union. As to the loss of full-time trade union leave of various officials of organizations affiliated to FENATEL, the company justifies this by the drastic decline in their representativeness.
3. 640. The Committee notes the Government’s statements concerning the imposition of sanctions on five CTC de Chile companies for non-respect of the collective agreement (ten monthly tax units and 7.5 million pesos) and for replacing strikers (69 monthly tax units equivalent to 1,721,700 Chilean pesos) and various anti-trade union practices determined by the judicial authority (5th Labour Court of Santiago) which had been previously submitted to the Inspectorate of Labour and which gave rise to a sanction by the judicial authority equivalent to 120 monthly tax units. The Committee notes that in the judgement it is indicated that CTC de Chile:
4. … had engaged in anti-trade union practices, prevention of free access by officials to company premises, “acts of interference” by favouring trade unions that do not belong to FENATEL and discriminating against the latter by encouraging its members to give up their membership, through disadvantageous proposals for agreements and meetings in which it inspired fear of losing their jobs in those who clung to the provisions of art. 369 of the Labour Code, specifically the members of the complainant trade unions. This conduct must be sanctioned in that it constitutes a violation of the free exercise of trade union activity.
5. 641. The Committee also observes that in the judgement the company is ordered to:
6. … cease its anti-trade union conduct, allow free access to FENATEL trade union officials and any other trade union official to the company’s premises, including those situated at 48, Calle San Martin; and must also cease any form of communication intended to inspire fear of loss of jobs relating to circumstances which arise from agreements which were or are legally agreed with the trade unions in the relevant collective bargaining processes. It must also ensure that it does not act in any way such as to discriminate between the various trade unions and especially that it does not encourage members to leave trade unions which for one reason or another are inconvenient to the company.
7. 642. Although it regrets the many acts of violence (as indicated in its statement as transmitted by the Government) which according to the company occurred during the 2002 strike, the Committee observes that the labour inspection and in certain cases the judicial authority in the first instance, sanctioned certain anti-union acts which took place during the industrial dispute which began in 2002 and in the subsequent collective bargaining. The Committee also observes that the judicial authority is still to decide certain appeals lodged by the company. In these circumstances, the Committee regrets the serious repercussions that these acts might have had on the level of membership of the FENATEL organizations, strongly expresses the expectation that such acts will not recur in the future and requests the Government to ensure compliance with Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 by the holding companies in the CTC de Chile Group. Moreover, taking into account the acts of violence during the strike to which the company refers, the Committee recalls that Article 8 of Convention No. 87 provides that “In exercising the rights provided in this Convention workers and employers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.”
8. 643. The Committee notes the information provided by the Government that the labour inspection obtained an unfavourable judgement concerning the non-respect of trade union leave but that judgement has been appealed. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of the result of appeal proceedings, including with regard to trade union leave and the non-implementation of the clauses of the collective agreement, and to indicate whether FENATEL has lodged an appeal with respect to the dismissal of the delegates of that organization in respect of whom the company states that it was unaware of their position as delegates and that, in any event, they did not enjoy trade union status.