Definitive Report - REPORT_NO85, 1966

1. 167. This case was examined by the Committee at its 36th Session, held in Geneva in February 1964. At that time the Committee submitted to the Governing Body an interim report setting forth its final conclusions in respect of some of the allegations in the case, whilst as regards others it recommended the Governing Body to seek additional information from the Government. These conclusions and recommendations, contained in the Committee's 75th Report, were adopted by the Governing Body at its 159th Session, on 10 July 1964.
2. 168. The paragraphs which follow deal only with the allegations which remain outstanding. These allegations relate to:
   • (a) infringements of the right of collective bargaining;
   • (b) governmental interference in connection with collective agreements; and
   • (c) the composition of arbitration tribunals.
3. 169. Greece has ratified both the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. A. The complainants' allegations

• Allegations relating to Infringements of the Right of Collective Bargaining
  170. 170 The allegations made in this respect by the complainants and the Government's observations thereon were analysed in detail in paragraphs 47 to 71 of the Committee's 75th Report. It will therefore suffice to recall briefly below the outlines of this aspect of the case.
  171. 171 These revealed that there were two trade union organisations claiming to represent the workers in the textile industry: on the one hand, the complaining organisation-the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Textile Workers-and, on the other hand, the Federation of Greek Textile Workers. According to the complainants the latter organisation had only about 1,000 members, whereas they themselves had a membership of 12,000.
  172. 172 It may also be seen from the information available to the Committee at that time that both the trade union organisations in question were " representative " of the workers concerned, a decision of the competent judge dated 6 November 1962 having recognised both the complaining organisation and the Federation of Greek Textile Workers as representative organisations.
  173. 173 Having begun negotiations with the employers with a view to the revision of the collective agreement in force, each of the two organisations submitted a different set of claims. Those submitted by the complaining organisation were rejected by the employers. Those put forward by the Federation of Greek Textile Workers, on the other hand, were acceded to by the employers, who concluded with that organisation a new collective agreement which was approved by the Minister of Labour.
  174. 174 The complaining organisation, claiming that it had been thrust on one side, thereupon requested the Minister of Labour to submit the case to an arbitration tribunal. The Minister refused to do so, justifying his refusal by the argument that having approved one collective agreement he could not approve another.
  175. 175 In order to settle the matter both the organisations concerned appealed to the Council of State. Faithful to its invariable practice, the Committee recommended the Governing Body at its February 1964 Session to request the Government to supply the text of the Council of State's decision as soon as it was pronounced.
  176. 176 With its reply dated 27 July 1965 the Government furnishes the text of the Council of State's decision, together with that of a decision of the first-instance arbitration tribunal of Piraeus as to the representative capacity of the two organisations concerned.
  177. 177 The Council of State noted that by its decision of 1962 (see paragraph 172 above) the first-instance arbitration tribunal of Athens had ruled that both the organisations involved were representative. The Council of State went on to say, however, that the arbitration tribunal was not empowered to take such a decision, its task being to determine which of the two organisations was the more representative and thereby qualified to represent the workers in the trade in collective negotiations. It therefore annulled the decision.
  178. 178 The question of the representative capacity of the two organisations concerned was then brought before the first-instance arbitration tribunal of Piraeus, which, at a public hearing on 16 July 1964, decided on the basis of the evidence submitted to it that the Federation of Greek Textile Workers, with its 17 affiliated unions representing a total of 30,043 members, was the more representative of the trade, the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Textile Workers being composed of only 11 unions with a total of 21,040 members.
  179. 179 The above-mentioned observations of the arbitration tribunal of Piraeus show that, contrary to the allegations made by the complaining organisation (see paragraph 171 above), that organisation is not the most representative of the textile workers. Moreover, since it is clear from the Council of State's decision that only the organisation the most representative of the textile workers is qualified to negotiate collective agreements, the Committee considers that the complaining organisation has not furnished sufficient proof in support of its allegations, and it therefore recommends the Governing Body to decide that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.
• Allegations relating to Governmental Interference in connection with Collective Agreements
  180. 180 The complainants alleged that the validity of collective agreements was decided at the discretion of the Ministers of Labour and Co-ordination, which, they said, were empowered to modify the terms of such agreements.
  181. 181 At its February 1964 Session the Committee noted that under section 20 (2) of Act No. 3239 of 1955, in fact, " in the event of any collective agreement ... being contrary to the general economic or social policy of the Government, or to any such policy in particular matters, the Ministers of Co-ordination and of Labour may ... amend or withhold approval of all or part of such agreement ... by means of a joint order (with reasons)...".
  182. 182 In its observations the Government pointed out that this provision of the law, dating from 1955, had been introduced to meet the urgent need that existed at the time to ensure the economic and financial stability of the country. As the situation had greatly changed meanwhile, it had been decided to amend the law in this respect, and a Bill for this purpose had been laid before Parliament, but, continued the Government, the Bill had not been passed owing to a change of government.
  183. 183 At its February 1964 Session the Committee took the view that before examining further this aspect of the case it would be advisable to ascertain the Government's intentions concerning the amendments to the legislation that had been contemplated by its predecessor. For this reason it recommended the Governing Body to request the Government to be good enough to inform it whether it intended to alter the section of Act No. 3239 referred to above and, if so, to specify the nature of the alterations contemplated or made.
  184. 184 In its reply the Government states that the draft Bill for the Labour Code, the text of which has already been submitted to the I.L.O, provides for a new system of collective bargaining and arbitration, and amends several provisions of Act No. 3239.
  185. 185 If reference is made to the text of the draft Bill, it would appear that under section 327, paragraph 2, the Minister of Labour is empowered, in certain circumstances which are not specified, to refuse to allow a collective agreement to be filed.
  186. 186 The Committee considers that if such a refusal may be based on grounds only of errors of pure form the provision in question is not in conflict with the principle of voluntary negotiation laid down by the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), ratified by Greece. The Committee feels, on the other hand, that if this provision implies that the filing of a collective agreement may be refused on grounds such as those set forth in section 20 of Act No. 3239, as quoted in paragraph 181 above, it amounts to a requirement that prior approval be obtained before a collective agreement can come into force, which infringes the principle of voluntary negotiation laid down by the aforementioned Convention. In this connection the Committee feels compelled, as on a number of occasions in the past, to emphasise the importance that should be attached to the principle that the public authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict the right of trade unions to seek, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, to improve the living and working conditions of those whom they represent, or impede the lawful exercise of this right.
  187. 187 Having said this, the Committee considers none the less that its objections to the requirement that prior approval of collective agreements be obtained from the Government do not signify that ways could not be found of persuading the parties to collective bargaining to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to considerations relating to the economic or social policy of the Government and the safeguarding of the general interest. But to achieve this it is necessary first of all that the objectives to be recognised as being in the general interest should have been widely discussed by all parties on a national scale through a consultative body such as the National Social Policy Advisory Board, in accordance with the principle laid down by the Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 1960 (No. 113). It might also be possible to envisage a procedure whereby the attention of the parties could be drawn, in certain cases, to the considerations of general interest which might call for further examination of the terms of agreement on their part. However, in this connection, persuasion is always to be preferred to constraint. Thus, instead of making the validity of collective agreements subject to governmental approval, it might be provided that every collective agreement filed with the Ministry of Labour would normally come into force a reasonable length of time after being filed; if the public authority considered that the terms of the proposed agreement were manifestly in conflict with the economic policy objectives recognised as being desirable in the general interest, the case could be submitted for advice and recommendation to an appropriate consultative body, it being understood, however, that the final decision in the matter rested with the parties to the agreement.
  188. 188 Since the Government is in the process of revising its legislation on the subject, the Committee hopes that the foregoing observations and suggestions will be taken into account, and therefore recommends the Governing Body to draw the Government's attention thereto.
• Allegations relating to the Composition of Arbitration Tribunals
  189. 189 The complainants alleged that Act No. 3239 provided for compulsory arbitration by tribunals without allowing the organisations concerned to appoint their representatives to them, since the workers' representatives were chosen by the Minister of Labour from among representatives nominated exclusively by the General Confederation of Greek Workers (C.G.T).
  190. 190 In its reply the Government stated that workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals were not chosen by the authorities from a list of persons nominated by C.G.T but appointed directly by that organisation, under section 10 (1) of Act No. 3239, as the most representative organisation of the workers.
  191. 191 At its February 1964 Session the Committee observed that while the workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals were not appointed by the Government on the proposal of C.G.T, but directly by that organisation, it was none the less true that, by the Act itself, it was for this organisation alone to decide who should be the workers' representatives on arbitration tribunals. But it was common knowledge, went on the Committee, that side by side with C.G.T there were other workers' federations in Greece. Without wishing to cast any doubt on the representative character of C.G.T, the Committee considered that it would be better able to form an informed opinion if it possessed precise information on the numerical strength and the representative character of the various main trade union organisations in Greece. It therefore recommended the Governing Body to request this information from the Government.
  192. 192 In its reply the Government makes no allusion to this aspect of the case. If one refers to the draft Bill for the Labour Code of which mention was made earlier, however, it will be seen that section 356 embodies the concept that the most representative unions should provide members for the National Arbitration Board. It will also be seen, however, that there is no provision in the draft Bill going into more detail on this point, and that section 356 leaves it to the discretion of the Minister of Labour to decide which employers' and workers' organisations are to be considered the most representative.
  193. 193 The Committee considers that in such circumstances it is important that the State should not intervene other than to give formal recognition to an existing situation, and that in assessing that existing situation-i.e. in determining whether an organisation is representative-it is indispensable that any decision should be based on objective criteria laid down in advance by an independent body, and founded in their turn on grounds which allow for no possibility of abuse.
  194. 194 Here again, for the same reason as given in paragraph 188 above, the Committee recommends the Governing Body to draw the Government's attention to the observations contained in the preceding paragraph.