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Repetition

The Committee notes the establishment in July 2019 of a power-sharing agreement between the country’s ruling military council and opposition groups (the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change) to share power for a three-year period of reforms, followed by elections for a return to full civilian government.

Article 3(1) and (2). Labour inspection functions and additional duties entrusted to labour inspectors. In its previous comments, the Committee noted the large number of collective and individual labour disputes handled by the labour inspectorate in 2016, and also noted a significant reduction from 2015 to 2016 in the number of labour inspections performed – more than 80 per cent based on statistics provided in the Government’s report. It further noted the Government’s statement that a lack of resources hindered the application of labour legislation.

The Committee notes the Government’s indication in response in its report, that there has been no reduction in the number of labour inspections. The Government states that labour inspectors do not intervene in the settlement of disputes and that their fundamental role is confined to carrying out inspections and monitoring the implementation of the Labour Code. The Government also states that labour inspectors provide employers and workers with information and technical guidance so that they can implement laws and regulations regarding termination of employment in the most effective manner. The Government further states that inspectors address and notify loopholes in labour legislation to the competent authority. Noting an absence of specific information in this respect, the Committee requests the Government to provide statistical information listed under Article 21(b)–(g) of the Convention, including on the number of inspection visits undertaken. It also requests the Government to provide detailed information on the proportion of activities of labour inspectors devoted to their primary functions under the terms of Article 3(1)(a)–(c) in comparison to their other duties. It requests the Government to indicate the authorities which handle collective and individual disputes and the role, if any, of inspectors in this regard. Lastly, it once again requests the Government to provide information on the role of labour inspectors in assisting the public authorities to implement orders relating to the public interest that requires the undertaking of inspection visits.

Article 5(a). Effective cooperation between the inspection services and the judicial system. The Committee previously noted the number of unresolved collective and individual disputes referred to the judicial authorities by the labour inspectorate and the number of cases dealt with by the courts in the State of Khartoum. In the absence of information from the Government, the Committee once again requests the Government to provide information, for all jurisdictions, on the number of cases referred to the judicial authorities by the labour inspectorate, the number of cases dealt with by the courts, the outcome of the cases referred (acquittal, fines, including amounts, or prison sentences), and the legal provisions to which they relate, (distinguishing these cases from those brought by workers themselves). It also requests the Government to provide information on any measures taken to promote effective collaboration between the labour inspectorate and the judicial system (including with regard to the exchange of information on the outcome of cases referred to courts).

Article 7(3). Adequate training for labour inspectors for the performance of their duties. The Committee notes the Government’s indication, in reply to its previous request, that training is provided for labour inspectors. The Committee requests the Government to provide more specific information on the training activities provided for labour inspectors, including the frequency, number of participants, subjects covered, and impact of the training activities.