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Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) - Bangladesh (RATIFICATION: 1972)

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Articles 2, 4 and 23 of the Convention. Labour inspection in export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones (SEZs). In its previous comments, the Committee noted that the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA) remained responsible for securing the rights of workers in EPZs (and that the labour inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour and Employment did not carry out any inspections in these zones), and expressed deep concern that the Government had not yet given effect to the 2014 conclusions of the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) to bring EPZs within the purview of the labour inspectorate. In this respect, the Committee noted that a draft EPZ Labour Act had been prepared, in relation to which the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) raised a number of concerns, including that the supervision of EPZs would remain vested with the BEPZA, and that the powers and functions of the EPZ labour courts and the EPZ Labour Appellate Tribunal would be severely limited in comparison with courts established under the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA), 2006.
Further to the Committee’s reiterated request to bring EPZs and SEZs under the purview of the labour inspectorate, the Committee notes the Government’s indication in its report that it is proposed to modify the current draft EPZ Labour Act to provide for labour administration and inspection in EPZs under the BLA, and that a relevant draft would be shared with the Office in due course. However, the Committee notes that the information provided in the Government’s report under the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87), which suggests that, despite structural changes being made, the administration and inspection in EPZs will remain separate from those under the BLA. In this context, the Committee also notes that the Government expresses the view that the BEPZA has successfully performed its duties in the area of compliance for the last 35 years, through the use of counsellors in the area of labour, environment, industrial relations, fire and building safety. Noting with deep concern that it has now been more than three years since the CAS request on this matter, the Committee urges the Government to complete its revised draft in the very near future so that the EPZ Labour Act will bring EPZs under the purview of the labour inspectorate, as requested by the CAS in 2014, and that the same will be done in relation to SEZs.
Article 6. Status and conditions of service of labour inspectors. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that retaining labour inspectors within the labour inspection services was problematic and that a number of recently recruited labour inspectors had left the Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments (DIFE), after having been trained, to take up work with other government services. In this regard, the Committee requested that the Government review the professional profiles and grades of labour inspectors to ensure that they reflect the career prospects of public servants exercising similar functions within other government services, such as tax inspectors or the police.
The Committee notes that the Government, in reply to the Committee’s request, refers to a revised salary structure for all government employees, available on the website of the Ministry of Finance in the Bengali language. According to the Government, the revised salary structure provides similar conditions for tax inspectors, labour inspectors and police officers. The Government also refers to a study to be undertaken with the assistance of the ILO, to discover the causes for the high attrition rate. Recalling from the report of the 2015 direct contacts mission (undertaken at the request of the CAS) that career prospects within the labour inspection services are not as favourable as those in the career civil service, the Committee once again requests the Government to provide information on the professional grade structure enjoyed by labour inspectors and other government employees exercising similar functions as well as further information on the salary and benefit structure applicable to labour inspectors. The Committee also requests the Government to provide information on the outcome of the study on the reasons for the high attrition rate of labour inspectors.
Articles 7, 10 and 11. Strengthening the human and material resources of the labour inspectorate. The Committee previously welcomed the increase in the number of labour inspectors from 43 to 283 (between 2013 and 2015), but noted with regret that the Government had failed to provide any new information in 2016 on the progress made with the recruitment of labour inspectors for the filling of the 575 approved labour inspection positions. The Committee notes the information provided by the Government in its report that 230 of the 575 positions still remain vacant, and that recruitment is ongoing. The Committee also notes the Government’s indication, in reply to the Committee’s request for further information on the material resources available to the labour inspectorate, that the budgetary allocation of the DIFE has continued to significantly increase; representing a fourfold increase from 2013–14 to 2017–18. In addition, the Committee notes the Government’s indication that an important project to further strengthen the capacity of the DIFE is under way. The Committee further notes, in reply to the Committee’s request, the information provided by the Government on the increase in equipment and transport facilities available to the labour inspectorate. The Committee requests the Government to specify the current number of labour inspectors working at the DIFE and to provide information about the training provided to new recruits including the subjects covered and the duration of such training. The Committee encourages the Government to continue to make every effort to fill all of the 575 labour inspection posts that have already been approved, with a view to ensuring the recruitment of an adequate number of qualified labour inspectors, taking into account the number of workplaces liable to inspection. The Committee also requests that the Government continue to provide information on the level of equipment and facilities available to the labour inspectorate.
Articles 12(1), 15(c) and 16. Inspections without previous notice. Duty of confidentiality in relation to complaints. In its previous comment, the Committee noted that in 2014, only 2.5 per cent of all inspections were random or complaints driven inspections without prior notice and it emphasized that, in that situation, the duty to maintain confidentiality of labour inspectors that an inspection was made as a result of a complaint, and the efficiency of inspections, were put at risk. In this respect, the Committee notes the Government’s reply, in relation to the Committee’s request for steps to ensure that a sufficient number of unannounced labour inspections (random or complaints-driven inspections implemented without prior notice) is undertaken, that during 2016–17, 20 per cent of all inspections were unannounced. The Committee notes that the Government reiterates, in reply to its previous requests to enshrine in law a requirement that the existence of a complaint and its source are kept confidential, that the absence of such a provision in the BLA, does not undermine confidentiality in practice. However, the Government adds that it is open to considering the codification of this duty in the context of the proposed review of the BLA. The Committee urges the Government to codify the duty of confidentiality, either in the context of the proposed review of the BLA or in other regulations or guidelines concerning labour inspection, for the purpose of legal clarity. The Committee requests that the Government provide information on the results of unannounced inspections covering investigations of accidents or addressing of complaints, including the nature of resolutions reached, violations identified and sanctions applied.
Articles 17 and 18. Legal proceedings, effective enforcement and sufficiently dissuasive penalties. The Committee notes that the Government, in reply to the Committee’s request for statistical information to enable the assessment of effective enforcement by the labour inspectorate, once again provides information on the number of workplaces inspected and the cases filed with the labour courts, but that it does not provide the requested information on penalties proposed by the inspectorate in connection with their detected violations or on the specific outcome of these cases (such as the imposition of fines or sentences of imprisonment). The Committee also notes that the Government, in reply to the Committee’s request for information on the measures taken to ensure that penalties for labour law violations are sufficiently dissuasive, indicates that the review of the amount of penalties might be considered in the context of the proposed review of the BLA. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the measures introduced or envisaged, in the context of the proposed legislative reform, to ensure that penalties for labour law violations are sufficiently dissuasive and, where applicable, to improve the proceedings for the effective enforcement of the legal provisions. The Committee also once again requests that the Government specify how many legal staff with responsibility for the enforcement of legal provisions are employed at the DIFE, and to provide information on the penalties recommended by the inspectorate, along with any relevant guidelines, and the outcome of the cases referred to the labour courts.
The Committee previously noted that freedom of association cases (including cases of anti-union discrimination) are addressed by the Department of Labour (DOL) which is, among other things, responsible for conciliation and mediation, and it indicated that cases of anti-union discrimination are not generally appropriate for conciliation or mediation and in any event must not undermine strict enforcement of applicable laws. The Committee requests the Government to provide information as to why violations of freedom of association are dealt with by the DOL, rather than the DIFE, and to provide detailed information on the manner in which it secures the enforcement of the legal provisions relating thereto.
The Committee is raising other matters in a request addressed directly to the Government.
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