CMNT_TITLE

Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (RATIFICATION: 1949)

Other comments on C081

Observation

Direct Request

Replies received to the issues raised in a direct request which do not give rise to further comments

2011

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Reform of the occupational safety and health (OSH) inspection system. The Committee previously noted the Government’s information on the reform of the national OSH inspection system implemented from 2011 with the launch of the “Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone” programme and requested more detailed information on the new system, particularly with regard to the following issues: (i) the reduction in the number of labour inspections; (ii) the increase in alternative forms of compliance such as self-assessments undertaken by private consultants; and (iii) the holding of employers financially liable for interventions in workplaces where they violate labour law provisions.

Articles 3(1)(a) and (b), 10, 15(c), 16, 17 and 18 of the Convention. Coverage of workplaces by labour inspection. The Committee previously noted the Government’s decision to modify the labour inspection strategy. The Government indicated that this is to reduce the bureaucratic burden on businesses and to make the OSH inspection system more effective. This is to be done by: (i) targeting inspections in higher-risk sectors (such as the construction industry or high-risk manufacturing and transport); (ii) reducing inspections in areas of concern but where inspections are unlikely to be effective (such as agriculture, quarries, health and social care); and (iii) discontinuing inspections in low-risk sectors (such as low-risk manufacturing and transport), although workplaces would still be subject to inspection in the case of underperformance concerning OSH. The Committee further noted that the identification of non-major hazard industries was made on the basis of a new targeting and intelligence system and that it was planned to reduce the number of inspections in non-major hazard industries, from 2010 to 2011 onwards, by one third every year. The Committee also noted the concerns previously expressed by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) that workplaces with identified lower safety risks do not necessarily have a lower incidence of cases of occupational disease, and that they should therefore not be categorized as low risk.

The Committee notes that the Government indicates, in reply to its request to provide information on the abovementioned selection process of workplaces for inspection, that inspections are targeted in line with sector strategies (which are determined based on the size and demographics of sectors, the incidence of occupational accidents and diseases and ill-health rates, potential future risks, and so forth) and indicators of serious risks in the area of OSH (gathered from labour inspections, concerns raised by workers, information transmitted by other sources such as individuals or entities, and so forth). The Committee also notes the Government’s indication that the sector strategies will be reviewed in 2016 by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to set inspection priorities for the next three years, with the participation of the social partners. In addition, the Committee notes that inspection targets are determined through the “Going to the Right Places Programme” and the “Find-it targeting tool”.

The Committee considers that the planning and targeting of inspection activities based on several indicators including in collaboration with the social partners may be an appropriate method to achieve improved coverage of workplaces by labour inspection. At the same time, it considers it important that governments ensure that certain, often vulnerable, categories of workers (such as workers in small and micro-enterprises and workers in agricultural areas) are not excluded from protection due to the fact that they are employed in workplaces or sectors that are not necessarily identified as being high risk, or in sectors where labour inspection is considered too resource intensive to undertake. The Committee requests further information regarding the effects of the OSH reform on the coverage of workplaces by labour inspection, including on the reviewed sector strategies and the workplaces that were targeted as a result. In this regard, it requests that the Government provide statistics on the number of labour inspections undertaken in each year since the implementation of the reform in 2011, including information on the number of workplaces covered by inspection (in small, medium-sized and large enterprises) disaggregated by the sector concerned, as well as the number of infringements detected and measures taken as a result. The Committee also requests that the Government provide statistical information on the number of labour inspectors and the budget allocations in each year since the reform.

The Government is also requested to provide further information on the “Going to the Right Places Programme” and the “Find-it targeting tool”, as well as clarification on whether indicators such as a high incidence of vulnerable workers play a role in determining priorities for inspection. The Committee also once again requests that the Government provide information on the means used by the labour inspectorate to detect underperformance in the area of OSH of workplaces that are currently not expected to be subject to inspections. The Committee further recalls that absolute confidentiality regarding the source of any complaint is required by the Convention, and requests that the Government indicate how confidentiality is preserved since the HSE is acting on intelligence transmitted by various sources as described.

Articles 3(1)(b), 5(a), 9 and 13. Strategies for compliance in lower-risk small and medium-sized workplaces (SMEs). In its previous comment, the Committee noted the initiatives in the envisaged reform, aimed at assisting employers particularly in lower-risk SMEs in meeting their legal obligations in the area of OSH. These included the establishment of a register for properly accredited OSH consultants to provide employers with easy access to accurate advice on OSH, and the development of guidance and online risk assessment tools. The Committee notes as set out above that the Government’s strategy is to focus inspections on particular sectors and that the Government’s strategy in relation to SMEs is to promote the use of private consultants. This is supplemented by the awareness-raising activities of the HSE, including through the Estates Excellence programme administered by the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL), a public sector research establishment, which has offered free support to more than 6,700 businesses since 2010. The Committee notes that the Government indicates, in reply to its previous request for information on the use of OSH consultants and the risk-assessment tools, that no information is available on the impact on compliance as a result of their use.

The Committee considers that self-assessments may provide a way to expand the reach of labour inspection activities if the results of this process might be used by the labour inspectorate as a source of information for identifying violations, planning visits, and designing prevention strategies, as long as they are complementary to, and do not replace, labour inspection. However, the Government has provided no information in this regard. In the absence of a reply to its previous request concerning the existence of a legal requirement in this regard, the Committee once again requests that the Government provide information on whether the use of self-assessments in workplaces not subject to inspection is voluntary or mandatory. Should there be a legal requirement to carry out self-assessments, the Committee requests that the Government provide information on the extent to which compliance with this obligation is monitored and enforced, particularly whether dissuasive sanctions are imposed for incomplete or inaccurate reporting regarding violations; and any data gathered in this respect. The Committee also requests that the Government indicate whether the results of self-inspections are fed into the inspection programming process and to indicate that all workplaces remain liable to inspection by the labour inspectorate.

Articles 6, 11 and 15(a). Fee for Intervention (FFI) scheme. In its previous comment, the Committee noted that it was envisaged to further extend the FFI cost recovery scheme, which, since 2012, obliges employers in breach of OSH requirements to cover the costs of the HSE in identifying, investigating, rectifying and/or enforcing relevant violations. The Committee notes that the Government indicates, in reply to the Committee’s request concerning the impact of this scheme, that independent reviews generated generally positive findings, including that the adverse impact on duty holders was significantly less than expected and that the FFI provides incentives for the improvement of OSH management. Moreover, the Government expresses its view that businesses in serious breach of OSH laws, rather than the taxpayer, should bear the costs of the HSE in helping them put things right.

However, the Government also acknowledges that some concerns were identified in the triennial review report of the HSE (referenced through a web link in the Government’s report) concerning the relationship between labour inspectors and those it regulates. The Committee notes that the triennial review report of the HSE raises specific concerns in relation to the FFI scheme as regards: a potential damage to the reputation of the HSE concerning impartiality and independence; the dependence of the HSE on the income from the FFI scheme (approximately £20 million (US$24.8 million) per year), without which its services are likely to be seriously impacted; and questions on whether the HSE has an income target to achieve through the FFI scheme.

The Committee considers that, in conformity with Article 11, it is essential for member States to allocate the necessary material resources so that labour inspectors can carry out their duties effectively. It is of the view that the regular allocation of resources shall be guaranteed irrespective of external conditions not under the control of the labour inspectorate. The Committee also recalls the principle provided for in Article 6 that labour inspectors shall carry out their tasks with impartiality, and the principle in Article 15(a) which provides that labour inspectors shall be prohibited from having any direct or indirect interest in the undertakings under their supervision. Recalling that it was previously envisaged to further extend the FFI scheme, the Committee requests that the Government provide information on the current scope of application of this scheme (such as its application in certain sectors, in cases of specific or serious violations, etc.). The Committee further requests that the Government provide information on the budgetary situation of the HSE, and the proportion of its budget raised from the FFI scheme. Please also provide information, where applicable, on any measures taken by the Government to avoid potential damage to the reputation of the HSE concerning impartiality and independence.