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1.  In its previous comments the Committee noted the observations made by the Scheme Workers Alliance (SWA) in communications dated 18 January, 14  May and 31 August 1999, as well as the observations made by the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union in a communication dated 16 August 1999, concerning the application by Ireland of a number of ratified ILO Conventions, including Conventions Nos. 29 and 105. The Committee has also noted the detailed explanations provided by the Government in reply to these observations.

The unions provided detailed submissions expressing concern about the situation of the unemployed, the conditions under which payments are made under the Irish Employment Action Plan (EAP) and the limited availability of jobs, which were low paying and not necessarily suited to the skills and interest of the unemployed. The unions alleged coercion of the unemployed and of other welfare recipients into accepting such work. In their submissions, the unions referred, in particular, to the fact that to fall within the definition of "forced or compulsory labour" in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention, work or service must be exacted "under the menace of any penalty", and that it was made clear during the consideration of the draft instrument by the Conference that the penalty here in question included "the loss of any rights or privileges".

The Government responded and denied breaches of Conventions Nos. 29 and 105, referring to developments in employment and labour market policy which were articulated in the EAP. The Government also referred to its commitment to implement the EU Employment Guidelines, as well as its preventative strategies concerning young unemployed.

The Committee has come to the conclusion that the unions’ allegations do not raise matters which fall within the scope of Convention No. 29. The problems of unemployment and the scarcity of work which may only be found in low-level positions so that persons perform work which they may not wish to do in order to maintain themselves, do not usually fall for consideration under the Convention. There have been occasions when such circumstances were considered to come under the Convention, such as cases where acquired rights under a contributory unemployment insurance scheme were subjected to new conditions bearing on the range of work to be accepted by benefit recipients; or where certain categories of welfare recipients, such as asylum seekers, were denied by the authorities access to the general labour market, while being compelled to perform certain jobs under the menace of losing their only means of subsistence. In the present case, however, the issue appears to be rather one of general economic constraints.

The Governing Body committee set up to examine a representation concerning a comparable scheme in 1997, indicated:

In a case where an objective situation of economic constraint exists but has not been created by the government, then only if the government exploits such situation by offering an excessively low level of remuneration could it to some extent become answerable for a situation that it did not create. Moreover, it might be held responsible for organizing or exacerbating economic constraints if the number of people hired by the government at excessively low rates of pay and the quantity of work done by such employees had a knock-on effect on the situation of other people, causing them to lose their normal jobs and face identical economic constraints (GB.270/15/3, paragraph 30).

This has not been shown to have happened in the present case.

The Committee therefore concludes that the matters raised by the unions do not bear on the application of the forced labour Conventions by Ireland.

2.  In the absence of the Government’s report, and referring to the general observation on the Convention made in its report to the 87th Session of the International Labour Conference (1999), the Committee requests the Government once again to include in its next report information as to the present position in law and practice as regards the following points:

(i)  whether there are prisons administered by private concerns, profit-making or otherwise;

(ii)  whether any private prison contractors deploy prisoners to work either inside or outside prison premises, either for the account of the contractor or for that of another enterprise;

(iii)  whether private parties are admitted by the prison authorities into prison premises of any kind for the purpose of engaging prisoners in employment;

(iv)  whether employment of prisoners outside prison premises, either for a public authority or for a private enterprise, is allowed;

(v)  the conditions in which employment under any of the above conditions takes place, in respect of remuneration (indicating the level and comparing it with any minimum wage normally applicable to such work), benefits accruing (such as pension rights and workers’ compensation), observance of occupational safety and health legislation and other conditions of employment (e.g. through labour inspection), and how those conditions are determined;

(vi)  what the source of any remuneration is (whether from public or private funds) and for what purposes it must or may be applied (e.g. for the personal use of the prisoner or if it is subject to compulsory deductions);

(vii)  for whose benefit is the product of prisoners’ work and any surplus profit deriving from it, after deduction of overheads, and how it is disbursed;

(viii)  how the consent of the prisoners concerned is guaranteed, so that it is free from the menace of any penalty, including any loss of privileges or other disadvantages following from a refusal to work.